The foreign reserves holdings of oil and some emerging economies including the BRIC countries are reaching stratospheric levels. This external surplus is largely a result of the run-up of the oil and commodity prices. Should these nations be complacent with their high levels of forex holdings or should they worry about the opportunity costs of holding high levels of foreign reserves? This savings glut of oil and emerging economies has been largely channelled to the US, cheaply financing its large current account imbalance. The US current account deficit is estimated to absorb about 75% of the global external surpluses. Increasing liquidity of the oil and newly industrialised economies are being funnelled into financial instruments issued by advanced countries yielding negative real rates of return. Holding adequate levels of foreign reserves is essential to meet the liquidity on account of imports and external debt service. Holding of foreign reserves balance in cash or low-yielding liquid instruments such as the US Fed securities is akin to holding cash and bank balance in current accounts by the corporate/household sector to meet the necessary liquidity in carrying out day-to-day transactions. But there is a trade off involved with increasing returns when funds are locked up in higher yielding but longer-term instruments. India's foreign reserves holdings has been around $300 billion for quite some time, forming almost 35% of our national GDP. The surge in reserves causes a mismatch between the opportunity costs of holding the reserves with macro-economic adjustment costs incurred when they fall short. There are several global benchmarks to determine the optimal level of foreign reserves holdings providing adequate liquidity for current account transactions such as imports and debt servicing. One rule of thumb is based on imports. It predicts that reserves should be enough to cover three months of imports. The current level of foreign reserves holdings in India covers 15 months of imports, making current foreign reserves holdings overvalued by five times. Another oft-used benchmark is the Guidotti-Greenspan rule. As per this rule, the reserves should be enough to cover the short-term debt, that is, the ratio of average reserves holdings to short-term debt payable during the year should be one. This ratio of reserves to short-term debt for India is seven as on end March, 2008. The reserves holding by this measure is seven times more than the requirement. The average reserves to GDP ratio is 35% in India as compared to 10% on average in advanced countries. All this means that our reserves are too high for comfort. The bulk of our reserves are invested in US Fed securities. The interest rates in both US and euro areas have yielded negative real rates of return of between 2% and 3% in the last 4-5 years. At this negative real yield on investments in US government securities, India's loss on its foreign reserves holdings is anything between $6 billion and $9 billion per annum at current reserves level. This is the high cost paid by the country for maintaining excessive liquidity, besides the opportunity costs foregone by not investing in longer maturing, higher yielding bonds and equities. By either measure of present level of short-term foreign debt of $44 billion or three-months import cover of $60 billion, a reserve level of $80 billion should provide comfortable liquidity. This reserve level is also 10% of GDP, the level maintained by most advanced countries. Thus by all measures, our foreign reserves holdings are over-liquid by $200-220 billion. A part of the excess reserves holdings can be gainfully employed by the RBI to intervene in the forex market to restore the value of a grossly undervalued rupee.-ET
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